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INTRODUCTION
In early 2006, when the United States began to negotiate a freetrade agreement (FTA) with Malaysia, many Malaysians took to
the streets to protest the commencement of the discussions.1 The
diverse coalition of demonstrators included people living with
HIV/AIDS, consumers, health activists and human rights groups.2
Their concerns—that differences between a U.S. bilateral trade
arrangement and the preexisting global intellectual property (IP)
standards could have dangerous implications on public health—are
shared by economists at the World Bank, NGOs, and trade
negotiators in Geneva.3 One key apprehension regarding the FTA
is the potential effect of the agreement’s IP provisions on the
pharmaceutical industry.4 The IP terms5 afford greater exclusivity
rights to originator drug companies, and prevent increased
competition from generic manufacturers.6 With less competition,
pharmaceutical prices may rise beyond the budgets of thousands of
Malaysian citizens,7 many of whom are victims of the country’s
severe AIDS and tuberculosis epidemics.8
As of 2005, there are an estimated 69,000 people in Malaysia
living with HIV/AIDS,9 and a UNAIDS report warns that there are
elements that could cause Malaysia’s epidemic to erupt suddenly.10
1

Chee Yoke Heong, Malaysians Protest Against Free Trade Talks with U.S., FTA
MALAYSIA, June 13, 2006, http://www.ftamalaysia.org/article.php?aid=66 [hereinafter
Malaysians Protest Talks].
2
Id.
3
Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 349 (2005) (internal citations
omitted).
4
See Malaysians Protest Talks, supra note 1.
5
For a discussion of the IP terms that the U.S. will attempt to negotiate, see infra Parts
I.A and I.C–D.
6
See infra Parts I.D–E.
7
See Malaysians Protest Talks, supra note 1.
8
See UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE: DECEMBER 2006—ASIA,
http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/05-Asia_2006_EpiUpdate_eng.pdf
9
See id.; see also UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL SESSION ON
HIV/AIDS, MONITORING THE DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT ON HIV/AIDS—COUNTRY
REPORT: MALAYSIA 5 (2005), http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/2006_country_
progress_report_malaysia_en.pdf. [hereinafter UNAIDS-REPORT].
10
See UNAIDS-REPORT, supra note 9, at 1; see also S. Singh & N. Crofts, 5(3) HIV
Infection Among Injecting Drug Users In North-East Asia, AIDS CARE 273, 273–74,
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High risk behavior, especially intravenous drug usage, has
contributed to the rise in incidence of HIV.11 The increase in HIV
was especially strong among Malaysians with the lowest levels of
income and fewest years of schooling.12 This public health
situation, which particularly affects the most vulnerable parts of
Malaysia’s population,13 makes the prices of life-saving
medications a vital consideration in the country’s FTA negotiations
with the U.S.
In the U.S.-Malaysia trade discussions, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) will undoubtedly push for increased levels
of IP rights.14 These “ironclad” IP protections are accompanied
with promises of increased foreign direct investment,15 but the
primary inquiry must be whether the new provisions will interfere
with Malaysia’s ability to address its public health needs.
Acknowledging Malaysia’s unique social, economic, and industrial
characteristics, this paper evaluates the prospective impact that a
trade agreement with the U.S. could have on public health, paying
particular attention to the provisions on data exclusivity as well as
marketing approval and patent linkage requirements. Part I of this
note presents (A) background on the TRIPs agreement and
regional/bilateral trade agreements, (B) the current public health
environment in Malaysia, (C) an outline of the broad policy
considerations of pharmaceutical exclusivity rights, and (D)–(E)
the relevant IP protections present in the TRIPs agreement, and in
regional and bilateral trade agreements. Part II discusses the
ramifications of U.S.-FTA-level IP provisions, and the positive and
negative implications that the heightened IP regime may have on
the pharmaceutical industry in Malaysia. Part II.A outlines the
benefits of a U.S.-Malaysia FTA that follows an approach closer to
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed
&list_uids=8218462&dopt=Abstract.
11
See UNAIDS-REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.
12
Singh & Crofts, supra note 10, at 273–74. Malaysia AIDS Council chairperson,
Datuk Paduka Marina Mahathir, noted that “we have an epidemic that is growing bigger
and faster than ever before.” Martin Khor, Tackling AIDS with Cheap Generic Drugs,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Dec. 6, 2004, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends35.htm.
13
Singh & Crofts, supra note 10, at 273–74.
14
See infra Part I.A.
15
Christopher J. LaFleur, U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, Luncheon Address at the
Johor Corporation: An FTA for the Future (Apr. 27, 2006).
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that of the TRIPs agreement in regard to pharmaceutical IP
standards. Part II.B, on the other hand, considers the benefits of
adopting the stronger data exclusivity/linkage regime that is
regularly advocated by the USTR and the pharmaceutical research
and development industry. Part III argues the FTA is likely to
have a negative effect on access to pharmaceutical products in
Malaysia. Part III also addresses a number of key points in the
U.S.-Malaysia FTA negotiations that can help balance the
pharmaceutical industry’s requirement of investment incentives
with the public’s need for affordably priced medicines. Part IV
concludes that the free-trade agreement will likely contain IP
protections that are in excess of the level most appropriate for
Malaysia’s social and economic needs.
I. LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR THE U.S.-MALAYSIA FTA
A. International Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property Rights
In 1994, with the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) established a comprehensive IP regime
that imposed minimum IP requirements on all member states.16
TRIPs required nations to employ strict IP protections where in
many cases comparable domestic laws did not exist, or where they
were not nearly as demanding as the provisions expounded in
TRIPs.17 Among the most divisive issues, and one that has
received a great deal of publicity, was the potential effect that
TRIPs-level patent protection would have on pharmaceutical costs
and availability.18 Under the new rules, companies were able to
obtain the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the pioneer drugs
16

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. XXIX,
Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
17
Clark A.D. Wilson, The TRIPs Agreement: Is It Beneficial to the Developing World,
or Simply a Tool Used To Protect Pharmaceutical Profits for Developed World
Manufacturers?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 243, 245 (2005).
18
See Keith E. Maskus, Access to Essential Medicines and Affordable Drugs: Ensuring
Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563,
564 (2002).
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that they developed anywhere in the world.19 Additionally, generic
drug manufacturers were therefore prevented from entering the
market and prices were able to remain artificially high.20 As a
result, many WTO member countries, particularly those countries
facing high prevalence of AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, feared
that their governments and patients would be unable to afford the
drugs needed to combat pandemics and to meet other medicinal
needs.21 Exorbitantly high drug prices in the developing world
clearly illustrated that there were market failures in delivering
affordable, life-saving medications.22
In addition to the global TRIPs agreements conducted under
the auspices of the WTO, countries are increasingly entering
bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs).23 There is a
trend in FTAs to establish IP protections that are in excess of those
provided by the TRIPs agreement.24 These provisions are known
as “TRIPs-plus” conditions.25 These agreements allow countries
with greater bargaining power to negotiate trade policies without
having to deal with organized opposition to their demands and
without the same transparency that takes place with WTO
negotiations.26 Terms that would have been, and often were,27
rejected in the TRIPs negotiations often appear in bilateral trade
agreements because the smaller nations feel that despite their
concessions they are ultimately better off having some degree of

19

See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 16, art. XXIX, Annex 1C, art. 27.1.
See Wilson, supra note 17, at 250.
21
See generally Maskus, supra note 18.
22
Id.
23
The Domino Effect of US FTAs: Public Health Groups, Members of Congress claim
CAFTA will choke Access to Medicines, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Apr. 4, 2004,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=8&res=1024&print=0 [hereinafter The
Domino Effect of US FTAs].
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
See Abbott, supra note 3, at 349; see generally DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 112–40 (M.E. Sharpe 2004).
27
See CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR
THE REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 53–54 (2002), available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/
protection/protection.pdf.
20
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free trade relations.28 The United States in particular has been
aggressively pursuing such agreements and has concluded eighteen
FTAs since 1985.29 Eleven other countries have held talks with the
U.S. regarding the establishment of future trade agreements.30
One of the U.S.’s key trade goals is to conclude a free trade
agreement with Malaysia.31 While negotiations are conducted with
little transparency,32 certain provisions of the future FTAs can be
anticipated based on prior agreements that the USTR concluded.33
The USTR uses these past FTAs as blueprints for future trade
negotiation, so it is unlikely that the U.S. would fail to include
similar provisions in new trade agreements.34 In addition to
relying on the precedent of earlier FTAs, there are further
indications that the U.S. would not deviate from its stringent IP
provisions.35 In fact, it is likely for the U.S. and Malaysia to agree
to IP provisions that are at least as strict as the prior FTAs because
Malaysia’s plan for economic development specifically aims to
place more emphasis on knowledge intensive sectors of the
economy.36
In signing the Trade Investment Framework
28

Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around
the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 474
(2005) (explaining that less developed nations make IP concessions in exchange for
market access in the U.S.).
29
See Robert McMahon, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, June 13, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10890/. Of the
eighteen negotiated agreements, four have not yet entered force and three are awaiting
Congressional approval. Id. See also Katherine A. Helm, Note, Outsourcing the Fire of
Genius: The Effects of Patent Infringement Jurisprudence on Pharmaceutical Drug
Development, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 153, 154 (2006)
(enumerating regional and global trade agreements in which the U.S. has participated).
30
See McMahon, supra note 29.
31
See Press Release, Office of the USTR, United States Malaysia Announce Intention to
Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/Press_Releases/2006/March/United_States,_Malaysia_Announce_Intention_to_
Negotiate_Free_Trade_Agreement.html.
32
See Abbott, supra note 3, at 349.
33
See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
34
See Office of the USTR—Trade Agreements Home, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_
Agreements/Section_Index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
35
See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
36
See THE ECONOMIC PLANNING UNIT, PRIME MINISTERS DEPARTMENT, NINTH
MALAYSIA PLAN 2006–2010, PUTRAJAYA (2006) at 268 [hereinafter MALAYSIAECONOMIC PLAN], available at http://www.epu.jpm.my/rm9/html/english.htm (noting the
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Agreement to initiate negotiations between the governments, both
countries recognized that IP rights were going to be a major part of
the trade agenda.37 The American Malaysian Chamber of
Commerce similarly acknowledged that Malaysia would be
adopting stronger IP protections as a result of the trade
agreement.38 The USTR also made it clear that the nation believes
that “economies demand pacts that . . . strengthen intellectual
property rights,” and therefore the U.S. will make progress on
these pressing IP rights issues through the upcoming U.S.Malaysia Free Trade Negotiations.39
The USTR’s desire to strengthen IP laws in FTAs is illustrated
in its 2006 “301 Report” on IP rights standards, wherein the USTR
specifically expressed concern over the fact “that Malaysia has
enacted neither protection against unfair commercial use of
undisclosed test and other data submitted by pharmaceutical
companies seeking marketing approval for their products, nor a
coordinated mechanism between the health authorities and patent
office to prevent the registration of unauthorized copies of patentinfringing products.”40 In fact, these two IP protections, data
exclusivity and patent linkage,41 have been included in every U.S.
FTA to date.42 As FTAs require contentious and extensive
recent increase in patent registration, and the policy reasons that favor further measures to
continue increasing the role of intellectual property).
37
See Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Malaysia, U.S.-Malaysia, preamble,
annex, May 10, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/TIFA/
asset_upload_file922_10023.pdf.
38
See AMCHAM Malaysia-US Chamber Public Submission on the US-Malaysia FTA,
(May, 19 2006), available at http://www.amcham.com.my/Portal/DialoguePosition_
List.aspx?ctg=2041885b-0a81-4861-83ff-e505d43c10d7 (then click the link of the
document’s title).
39
Ambassador Karan K. Bhatia, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks to the
Asia-Pacific Council of the American Chambers of Commerce, Manila, The Philippines
(Mar. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Transcripts/
2006/March/asset_upload_file469_9143.pdf.
40
Office of the USTR, 2006 Special 301 Report—Watch List, http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_
upload_file190_9339.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
41
See infra Parts I.C–D for a detailed treatment of what these IP rights require of the
parties.
42
The U.S.-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, PENANG ECONOMIC MONTHLY, May
2006, at 8, available at http://www2.seri.com.my/Economic%20Briefing%20-%20Pg
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negotiations, the USTR noted that while there may be a temptation
for some parties “to lower their standards[,] [w]e won’t.”43 The
U.S. has no intention of proposing anything less than its typical,
stringent IP standards in its current negotiations with Malaysia.
A number of common FTA provisions are relevant to
pharmaceutical prices and delivery of medical treatment, including
patent term extensions and expanded scope of patentable subject
matter.44 For the purposes of this paper, however, the likely U.S.Malaysia FTA terms relating to data exclusivity and marketing
approval will be the focus, as these terms were specifically noted
by the USTR as deficiencies in Malaysia’s IP regime.45 These
provisions delay generic drug manufacturers in getting approval to
market their product, thus keeping the market free from
competition—even when a patent term has expired.46 In addition,
data exclusivity may impact the ability of a government to issue a
compulsory license, which is considered a valuable mechanism for
reducing drug prices.47
B. Intellectual Property and the Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical industry’s progress depends on expensive
research and development (R&D) costs.48 It maintains that
effective IP protections are necessary to allow companies to recoup
%20Econ%20Rept/EconBrief2006-05.pdf (stating that “[d]ata exclusivity is one of the
provisions in all U.S. FTAs[].”).
43
Bhatia, supra note 39.
44
See Abbott, supra note 3, at 350.
45
See infra Parts I.C–D.
46
See infra Parts I.D–E for a detailed treatment of what these IP rights require of the
parties.
47
See infra Parts II.A.3 and III.B.3 for a detailed treatment of how data
exclusivity/patent linkage can impact a country’s ability to issue compulsory licenses.
48
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH,
PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (2006), available
at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/ [hereinafter CIPR].
Allowing
inventors to “appropriate the returns from their intellectual creations . . . [by granting] a
time-limited monopoly” is known as the incentive function of patent protection. Id.
Many argue that without this mechanism the collective society would see less innovation,
and a temporary increase in price would outweigh the costs of that lack of innovation. Id.
at 19–20. See also id. at 19–21 (providing a brief discussion of the various other
justifications for patent protection, including the transactional, disclosure, and signaling
functions).
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these expenses by excluding others from selling their medical
inventions for a limited period of time.49 Studies estimate that the
lengthy development process of a new drug costs from $110 to
$880 million.50 With patent protection, and other forms of
exclusivity, many countries hope to stimulate a homegrown market
that has the capacity to conduct R&D and produce necessary
pharmacological ingredients.51 Also, of special significance to
developing countries, IP protections can enhance foreign direct
investment in domestic markets.52
Opponents of stringent IP regimes often argue that the increase
in pharmaceutical costs that result from the granting of exclusivity
outweigh the resulting increases in innovation and investment.53
This is especially true for smaller markets or less technologically
advanced countries where IP protections alone may do little to
stimulate innovation.54 Those who are against increased patent
protection also point out that the asserted costs of R&D may be
exaggerated.55 Based on financial reports from 2004, “the seven
largest US pharmaceutical companies spend, on average, only
fourteen percent of their revenues on R&D while thirty-two
percent is spent on marketing, advertising, and administration.”56
The profits realized in the major markets alone more than recoup

49

See CIPR, supra note 48, at 32.
Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European
Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 481 (2004). See also Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22(2) J. HEALTH
ECONOMICS 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the cost of bringing a drug to market to be $403
million).
51
See CIPR, supra note 48, at 32.
52
See FTA WATCH, OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL FREE TRADE AND INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 8 (2006), http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/Overview.pdf. “A number of
[Asian governments]—such as Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand—are
particularly trying to position themselves as hubs for the new trade and investment flows”
through trade agreements. Id.
53
CIPR, supra note 48, at 25.
54
Id.
55
OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 86, PUBLIC HEALTH AT RISK: A US
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT COULD THREATEN ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THAILAND 13
(2006), http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefingpapers/bp86_thailand_publichealth, 17–
19.
56
Id. The report notes that the companies “report more in profits—18 percent of
revenue—than they spend of R&D.” Id. (citations omitted).
50
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the expenses associated with drug development.57 It is also argued
that the “[d]eveloping countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
together account for only about 11 percent of the world
pharmaceutical market,” and therefore the benefits to developedcountry pharmaceutical firms will be limited.58
C. Public Health and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Malaysia
The Malaysian health care system is heavily subsidized by the
government, which assists in providing access to medicines for a
largely impoverished population.59 However, “[t]he Ministry of
Health estimates that . . . [public and private healthcare
expenditures] would need to rise to about 7 [percent] of GDP by
2020 to match developed country standards.”60 This increase will
“put great strain on the government’s finances” and delays in
receiving medical treatment may become “permanent feature[s] of
the system.”61
In 2004, Malaysia was one of the first countries to issue a
compulsory license, a mechanism that allows a government to
authorize generic drugs to enter the market despite the existence of
a valid patent.62 According to the Health Ministry, the increased
competition reduced the costs of treating patients with the patented
brand name drugs from $261 to $197 per month.63 The decrease in
cost of treatment using generic drugs was even more drastic,
falling to $45 per month, which was a mere 17.4% of the costs
based on the 2001 price of the equivalent patented products.64
With the same level of resources dedicated to providing HIV
treatment, the government could effectively treat six patients for
57

Id.
Id.
59
See UNAIDS—Malaysia, supra note 8, at 8.
60
THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INDUSTRY FORECAST: ASIA AND AUSTRALIA—
MALAYSIA 60 (2005) [hereinafter EMI-M].
61
Id.
62
Khor, supra note 12.
63
Id. See also THAILAND MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THAILAND HEALTH PROFILE
430, http://www.moph.go.th/ops/health_48/CHAP10.PDF (last visited Mar. 18, 2007)
(using the 90% reduction in the cost of a drug after the period of market exclusivity to
illustrate the foreseeable cost escalation associated with adopting a stringent intellectual
property regime).
64
Khor, supra note 12.
58
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the price that it once cost to treat one person.65 With a tight
healthcare budget, one which will likely need to expand in the
coming years, the price of pharmaceuticals will be a key factor in
medical treatment programs.66
So while there is arguably potential for increased economic
growth through participation in FTAs, there may also be severe
social implications for developing countries as a result of the
agreements’ IP provisions.67 This impact may be even more
extreme in those cases where the FTA’s IP protections are
substantially in excess of the TRIPs Agreement’s requirements.68
Two key IP protections that affect the pharmaceutical market—
and that are priorities in the U.S.-Malaysia trade negotiations—will
be discussed in turn. Section I.D will discuss clinical test data
protection, and Section I.E will discuss linkage requirements
between drug registration and patent status.
D. Clinical Test Data Protection in U.S. Trade Agreements
1. What is Clinical Test Data?
Before a pharmaceutical can be marketed for sale, the
originator of the drug must demonstrate its “efficacy and safety for
its intended therapeutic use.”69 This requires “extensive testing on
animals and humans in pre-clinical and clinical trials, as well as
toxicology, manufacturing feasibility and other scientific
studies.”70 The final stages of development, when human testing is

65

Id.
See EMI-M, supra note 60, at 62. This increase in spending is to account for an
increase in the elderly population, a growing awareness of the role of healthcare services,
continued urbanization, and increased incidents of cardiovascular disease. Id.
67
See generally MEDICAL SANS FRONTIERES, TOO LITTLE FOR TOO FEW: CHALLENGES
FOR EFFECTIVE AND ACCESSIBLE ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY (2006), http://www.access
med-msf.org/documents/MSF%20Toronto%20IAC.pdf [hereinafter MSF] (discussing
accessibility in the context of HIV/AIDS treatment).
68
Id.
69
INT’L FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOC., ENCOURAGEMENT
OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 2 (2000),
http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR83/DataExclusivity.pdf [hereinafter IFPMA].
70
Id.
66
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undergone, may require hundreds of human test subjects.71 While
statistics as to the time and costs of this data gathering vary,72 it is
clear that the process is “risky, laborious, and expensive.”73
2. TRIPs Provisions on Clinical Test Data Protection
The TRIPs Agreement’s provision on test data protection,
Article 39 Paragraph 3, stipulates that “[m]embers, when requiring,
as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical[s,] . . .
the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data
against unfair commercial use.”74 Unfair commercial use includes
(1) creating confusion with the activities or goods of a competitor,
(2) falsely discrediting a competitor, or (3) misleading the public
as to the nature and suitability of goods.75 The data protection
afforded by the TRIPs Agreement differs from that of the U.S.
FTAs in that TRIPs applies only to “unfair trade practices,” and
that the member country must only prevent “disclosure.”76 The
U.S. FTAs, on the other hand, provide “exclusive rights to the
originator.”77 It is clear that during the negotiations of the TRIPs
Agreement the U.S. government, as well as business communities
from the U.S., Europe, and Japan, proposed that the Agreement
provide for data exclusivity.78 However, these proposals were
rejected.79 Countries favoring stronger data protections were
71
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 468 (2004).
72
See DiMasi et al., supra note 50, at 166; IFPMA, supra note 69, at 2 (estimating the
cost to be around $500 million dollars).
73
Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 468.
74
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 16, art. XXIX, Annex 1C, art. 39.3.
75
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10, Mar. 20, 1883,
as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
76
MSF, supra note 67, at 3.
77
Id. Under TRIPs, “WTO members do not have an obligation under Art. 39.3 to
confer exclusive rights to test data . . . as pointed out by many experts.” Id. at 4 (citing
Correa, supra note 27, at 44).
78
See Correa, supra note 27, at 53–55. Unlike the proposals, which requested
protection for any “commercial or competitive benefit,” the final draft of Article 39 only
applied to “unfair commercial use.” Id.
79
See id. at 53–54.
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unable to secure such terms in the multilateral negotiations, but
they are now imposing these terms on nations through bilateral
agreements.80
3. FTAs Provisions on Test Data Protection
While proponents of exclusivity for clinical test data were not
entirely successful in the negotiations leading up to the TRIPs
agreement, they have since fared much better in bilateral
negotiations.81 Recent U.S. FTAs provide data exclusivity for a
minimum of five years, and in some cases a three-year extension is
available.82 For example, Article 16.8 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA,
which contains a standard data exclusivity provision, reads:
If a Party requires the submission of information
concerning the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical or
agricultural chemical product prior to permitting the
marketing of such product, the Party shall not permit third
parties not having the consent of the party providing the
information to market the same or a similar product on the
basis of the approval granted to the party submitting such
information for a period of at least five years from the date
of approval for a pharmaceutical product . . . .83
In other words, when a generic manufacturer applies for
marketing approval it cannot rely on the earlier test data that was
submitted in the application of the original drug manufacturer’s
application. It is important to note that this provision is not part of
a patent regime; instead it is a parallel form of IP protection that
can exist even when a pharmaceutical product is not patented.84
80

See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
See MSF, supra note 67, at 3.
82
See CARSTEN FINK & PATRICK REICHENMILLER, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, TRADE
NOTE: TIGHTENING TRIPS: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF RECENT US
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 5 (2005) (providing a table cataloguing the IP provisions that
have been included in eight recent FTAs).
83
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, at 196, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_
Index.html [hereinafter Singapore FTA].
84
See MSF, supra note 67, at 2–3.
Compared to more traditional intellectual property rights such as patents and
copyrights, data exclusivity is very unusual since it does not require any
81
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Therefore, even if the original drug is off-patent, a generic
company will not be able to get marketing approval for its product
unless it generates its own test data or waits until the exclusivity
period runs.85 In addition to the impediments data exclusivity
causes in allowing generic companies to enter the market, it also
may prevent countries from using compulsory license grounds to
exempt generic manufactures from patent protections in order to
meet public health demands.86
E. Patent-Registration Linkage Requirements in U.S. FTAs
Patent-Registration Linkage (“linkage”) is “the practice of
linking drug marketing approval to the patent status of the
originator’s product and not allowing the grant of marketing
approval to any third party prior to the expiration of the patent term
unless by consent of the patent owner.”87
Essentially, even if a generic company has prepared clinical
test data (or is permitted to rely on the data of an earlier registrant)
it still would not be able to register its product because the Drug
Regulatory Agency (DRA) has determined that the originator’s
patent is still in effect. Linkage provisions thus pose two problems
for the second applicant by (1) requiring the national regulatory
inventive activity for it to be granted. Data protection is instead only based on
the fact that an investment has been made by the originator in carrying out the
necessary tests to demonstrate . . . their new medicine[’s suitability for sale to
the public].
Id. at 3.
85
See Carlos Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System
for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 92 (2004).
86
The TRIPs agreement provided member states with a number of mechanisms, called
flexibilities, to insure that IP protection would not hinder a government from pursuing
compelling state objectives, such as insuring the health of its public. See id. at 94. U.S.
FTAs include many of these flexibilities, though in many instances they vary as to what
ground they will allow a country to make an exception to a patent right. See OXFAM,
supra note 55, at 17–19. An example of one such flexibility is compulsory licensing,
whereby a government (or authorized third party) is allowed to produce a drug that is
under patent, in order to deal with a public health crisis. Id. However, it is unclear
whether these emergency drugs would ever be able to reach the market in light of the data
exclusivity provisions which would require the producer to generate its own clinical
testing data before the drug regulatory agency would give the drug market approval.
87
CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, RESPONSE TO THE 2006 PHRMA “SPECIAL
301” SUBMISSION FOR CHILE 4 (2006) [hereinafter CP-TECH].
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agency to make an assessment on the validity of the patent, and by
(2) putting the burden on the applicant to prove that the
originator’s patent is invalid.88 Such provisions therefore force the
DRA to act as “patent police,”89 a role that is clearly beyond the
expertise of a nation’s health authority.90
The linkage terms in U.S. trade agreements are epitomized by
the U.S.-Chile FTA, which provides that, in regard to
pharmaceuticals that are under patent, the parties shall, in addition
to preventing a grant of marketing approval, “make available to the
patent owner the identity of any third party requesting marketing
approval effective during the term of the patent.”91 When the
patent holder is notified of such application, a protracted judicial or
administrative battle may arise between the parties,92 thus further
delaying the ability of the generics to enter the market.
Whereas test data protection appeared in TRIPs, and is being
extended by FTAs, the linkage requirements contained in U.S.
FTAs are entirely unprecedented both in TRIPs and in the national
legislation of many of the U.S.’s trading partners.93 Despite the
establishment of minimum levels of global IP standards in the
TRIPs Agreement, even stronger IP protections for
pharmaceuticals are consistently included in subsequent FTAs that
have been concluded.94 The positive and negative impacts of these
expanded IP protections will vary depending on the market and
legal regime in which they are applied.95

88

See CP-TECH, supra note 87, at 4.
See OXFAM, supra note 55, at 18.
90
Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 89.
91
Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.10.2(b), Jan. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_up
load_file912_4011.pdf [hereinafter Chile FTA].
92
See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of
WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement
and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 709 (2004) (explaining that
notifying the original applicant is likely to encourage patent owners to “make mischief”
for the parties subsequently seeking market approval).
93
See Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 90–91.
94
See supra Parts I.A, I.D–E.
95
See infra Parts II–III.
89
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II. THE EFFECTS OF THE FTA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTIONS ON DRUG PRICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN MALAYSIA
A. The FTA’s Strict Intellectual Property Provisions May Make It
More Difficult for Malaysians to Acquire Affordable
Medications
The U.S.-Malaysia FTA will entail certain increases in IP
protection that will have three important ramifications for the costs
of pharmaceuticals. First, data exclusivity will allow patent
owners to lengthen their period of monopoly beyond the twenty
year grant, and will even allow a five-year market exclusivity
period for pharmaceuticals that are not under a patent.96 Second,
the linkage requirements will delay the entry of generic drugs into
the market even after a patent term has run.97 Finally, the
compulsory licensing mechanism, one that Malaysia has used
before,98 may no longer be available.99 These impediments to
increasing competition in the drug market will make many drugs
more expensive, putting the most vulnerable Malaysians at risk.100
The implications of each provision will be discussed in turn. The
potential impact of these provisions on compulsory licensing will
be treated separately.
1. Regulatory Data Protection Will Effectively Extend Periods
of Exclusivity, and Allow Market Exclusivity for NonPatentable Chemical Entities
In Malaysia, a pharmaceutical manufacturer must provide
(1) Administrative Data and Product Information, (2) Quality Data,
(3) Clinical Test Data, and (4) Non-Clinical Test Data in its
registration application before its pioneer drug is approved for
sale.101 A subsequent generic manufacturer, however, only needs
to provide information on the first two categories, as well as a
96

See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
98
See supra Part I.C.
99
See infra Part II.A.3.
100
See supra Part I.B.
101
See MINISTRY OF HEALTH—NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROL BUREAU, DRUG
REGISTRATION GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (MALAYSIA) 35 (2004) [hereinafter DRGD].
97
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showing that its drug is therapeutically equivalent to the
original.102 The subsequent generic manufacturer need not repeat
the clinical testing, which will obviously arrive at the same results
that the original (chemically identical) drug’s tests generated.103
With a data exclusivity provision, such as those in U.S. FTAs, a
generic manufacturer would have to independently generate all the
test data in order to register its product.104 Because compiling this
data is costly and expensive, it is unlikely that a generic
manufacturer would be economically able to carry out these
tests.105 It would have to wait for the exclusivity period to run,
thus delaying the entry of its drug into the marketplace.106
An originator drug that receives regulatory approval late in its
patent term would have the data exclusivity period (at least five
years) tacked on to however much time remains on its patent.107
For instance, the Singapore FTA provides that, “[w]here a product
is subject to a system of marketing approval . . . and is also subject
to a patent in the territory of that Party, the Party shall not alter the
terms of the [data exclusivity] protection . . . .”108 Therefore, the
term of patent exclusivity may be exhausted, but nonetheless the
clinical data still explicitly receives protection.109 This exclusivity
is provided even if a product is unpatented, or where a patent was
granted incorrectly.110

102

See id. at 25, 35.
See id. at 35.
104
See supra Part I.D.3.
105
See Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 465 (observing that “[l]ow-capitalized generic
companies in small developing countries facing limited prospective revenues are
generally not able to afford this expenditure”).
106
SISULE MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 125 (2005) [hereinafter CIPRH REPORT].
107
Id.
108
See Singapore FTA, supra note 83, at 196–97.
109
Id. at art. 16.8(4)(a). The Singapore FTA also has a requirement specifically
included for pharmaceuticals which stipulates that patent terms should be extended in
light of any “unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing
approval process[.]” Id. See Susan Scafidi, The “Good Old Days” of TRIPs: The U.S.
Trade Agenda and the Extension of Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection, 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 341, 349 (2004).
110
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma:
The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 728 (2005).
103

GALANTUCCI_FINAL_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:06:06 PM

U.S.-MALAYSIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

1101

In addition to the standard five-year exclusivity term, some
recent FTAs have also included a three-year extension of data
protection for “new clinical information.”111 Unlike the typical
five-year term, the further period of exclusivity is not limited to
“new” originator drugs.112 This three-year protection of data even
applies “to previously reviewed or approved pharmaceuticals.”113
While the additional three-year term is not included in all FTAs,
unlike the standard data exclusivity provision, its inclusion is
supported by a number of key players in the U.S.-Malaysia FTA
negotiations, including the American Malaysian Chamber of
Commerce and the Pharmaceutical Association of Malaysia
(PhAMA).114 The term that PhAMA proposes reads:
Where the Authority grants registration and license for an
application for a drug which includes an active ingredient
that has been earlier approved in another application
submitted to the Authority, based on confidential
supporting
information
containing
new
clinical
information . . . essential to the approval of the application,
the Authority shall not, for a period of 3 years . . . register
or grant license to another person in respect of that or a
similar drug product on the basis of that earlier grant or the
confidential supporting information submitted.115
This provision requires DRAs to provide data exclusivity for
information submitted as part of new drug applications, even for
non-originator drugs that are not patentable, such as “new
indications or other changes in a previously approved product that
require conducting new clinical trials to win [DRA] approval.”116
This protection can also be used to extend patent terms when an
originator company delays until the end of its period of test data
exclusivity, and then submits a subsequent application for drug
111

See Scafidi, supra note 109, at 350.
Id.
113
Id.
114
PHARMACEUTICAL
ASSOCIATION
OF
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATIONS
[hereinafter DE-PhAMA].
115
Id. at 3.
116
See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 727.
112

MALAYSIA,
DATA
EXCLUSIVITY:
1 (2006), http://www.phama.org.my
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registration.117 This tactic could be used, for example, if a
company were to switch a medicine from prescription to over-thecounter use.118 The company would provide the test data for a
“new use” of the same drug, and then have a three year period of
market exclusivity.119 When the initial patent or data exclusivity
term (whichever was still in effect) came to an end, a generic
company could sell the original drug, but it would be prohibited
from selling the drug in the newly approved capacity.120
Therefore, in the previous example, the generic company could not
gain approval for the over-the-counter (OTC) indications.121 The
generic company would only be able to continue selling its
prescription variant, which may not be able to compete with the
originator’s OTC product.122
Both the three- and five-year periods of data exclusivity can
prevent a generic company from getting its competing drugs to the
market in a timely manner.123 Usually, the cost of re-conducting
clinical trials is prohibitively expensive.124 However, even if a
generic manufacturer was able to produce its own test data, clinical
trials typically take six to eight years to complete.125 The
originator would thus have complete control of the market during
these periods, even without the protection from a validly granted
patent.
2. Linkage Requirements Will Delay Access to Affordable
Medicines
The practice of linking patent registration and DRA approval
prevents a drug manufacturer from obtaining market approval for a
117

Id. at 728.
Id. at 728–29. Further, a company may also be eligible to get the same type of test
data protection if it were to register the same drug for a new medicinal use. Id. at 729.
119
Id. at 728–29. See, e.g., Press Release, Kline & Co., Impending Wave of Rx-to-OTC
Switches Offers Significant Opportunities for Drug Companies (Aug. 15, 2002)
(examining the strategic considerations of drug companies in timing their regulatory
approval so as to prolong their market exclusivity).
120
See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 729–30.
121
Id. at 729.
122
Id.
123
See notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
124
See Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 468.
125
See Baker, supra note 92, at 709.
118
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drug while the original version of that drug is still under patent,
unless “by consent or with the acquiescence of the patent
owner.”126 Linkage requirements are prominent in U.S. trade
agreements.127 The requirements prevent the timely entry of
generic drugs into the market by forcing generic companies to wait
until the patent period has expired before submitting an application
to a DRA.128 Thus, subsequent applicants can no longer have their
drugs approved during the pioneering product’s patent term so that
upon expiration of the patent the drug can immediately enter the
market.129 Thus, the length of time it takes to get marketing
approval is basically an added period of market exclusivity for the
patent holder.130
For example, in Malaysia the National
Pharmaceutical Control Bureau typically takes twelve to eighteen
months to complete the drug registration process.131 The effective
length of a patent owner’s market exclusivity would typically be
twenty-one to twenty-one and one half years, instead of the
standard twenty-year patent term.132
Furthermore, DRAs have no expertise in determining the
validity of patents, and thus their role in determining drug safety
and efficacy should not be concerned with patent law
implications.133
The United States’ FTAs, which require
regulatory agencies to make patent infringement decisions,
“ignore[] that patents are private rights . . . [and] it is the patent
owner who needs to act before the courts if he wants to interfere
with the application procedures of a non licensed third party.”134
Even the most advanced regulatory agencies like the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration concede that they are incapable of
126

See Singapore FTA, supra note 83, at 197.
See FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 82, at 5 (showing that the U.S. trade
agreements with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, as well as CAFTA, all
include linkage provisions).
128
Id. at 2.
129
See, e.g., Singapore FTA, supra note 83, at 196.
130
See supra Part I.E.
131
Ames Gross, Pharmaceuticals in Asia: Regulatory and Safety Updates (May 4, 2005)
(presentation slides available at http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/
Asia_Drug_and_Safety_2005.pdf).
132
See id.
133
See Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 89.
134
Id. at 89–90.
127
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assessing patent rights.135 Additionally, by forcing DRAs to
address such concerns, “the process is kept in bureaucratic
darkness, as opposed to a drug company suing for patent
infringement through the courts.”136
The U.S. FTAs include provisions that surpass the
requirements of the TRIPs regime—a multilateral agreement that
was controversial in its own right. The linkage requirements are so
strict that they are in excess of the United States’ own national
regulatory requirements.137 As a result, linkage provisions in U.S.
FTAs will delay market entry of drugs, and will place additional
burdens on local DRAs.138
3. Data Exclusivity Could Potentially Be an Obstacle to the
Issuance of Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licensing is a mechanism used by governments to
allow third parties to produce a product that is protected by a valid
patent.139 If a patent owner will not license the rights to produce
his protected invention, then the government can authorize a thirdparty to manufacture the product.140 The TRIPs agreement, which
all WTO members, including Malaysia, have signed, provides for
compulsory licensing in Article 31.141 The Agreement requires
that a third party must first make “efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions” before a compulsory license is granted.142 If those
135

See UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM—MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, PREPARED FOR REP. HENRY
A. WAXMAN (2005), http://democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/2005060909490211945.pdf (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. §§ 50338, 50343 (Oct. 4, 1994) (explaining that “FDA
does not have the expertise to review patent information. The agency believes that its
resources would be utilized in reviewing applications rather than reviewing patent
claims.”)).
136
Kelly Hearn, Drug Deal, ALTERNET, May 25, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/
story/22081/.
137
See Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 93.
138
See id.
139
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
140
See id.
141
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXIX, Annex 1C, art. 31.
142
Id. at art. 31(b).

GALANTUCCI_FINAL_050807

2007

U.S.-MALAYSIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

5/8/2007 1:06:06 PM

1105

efforts are not successful within a “reasonable period of time,”
then a valid compulsory license may be issued in accordance with
TRIPs.143
The data exclusivity and registration linkage provisions in U.S.
trade agreements may impact a government’s ability to issue a
compulsory license.144 For instance, even if a license was granted,
the two FTA provisions discussed above would prevent the second
manufacturer from being able to get regulatory approval, and
therefore the drug could not legally enter the market.145 The
TRIPs-Plus terms of U.S. trade agreements “make illusory the
granting of compulsory licenses and non-commercial government
use, as prospective compulsory licensees are unlikely to have
sufficient incentives to replicate test data, and governments cannot
normally wait until a new set of test data has been developed.”146
B. The FTA’s IP Provisions Probably Will Not Have an Adverse
Affect on Malaysians’ Access to Low-Cost Drugs
The U.S.-Malaysia FTA’s TRIPs-plus provisions will increase
available levels of IP protection.147 By creating strong IP rights,
research-and-development-based industry investments will
increase, and Malaysia will not be prevented from having a vibrant
generic drug market.148 First, data exclusivity generally does not
work to extend patent terms, and providing five-year market
exclusivity periods for pharmaceuticals that are not under a patent
is necessary to encourage companies to conduct research on new
Second, linkage
uses for previously patented drugs.149
143
Id. The requirement that a negotiation is attempted between the parties is waived in
cases “of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency . . . [or i]n the
case of public non-commercial use[.]” Id.
144
See Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and
Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 127 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., Earthscan 2006).
145
See id.
146
Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 92; see also Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 473
(explaining that even if FTAs contain some of the “key loopholes” to patent rights
contained in the TRIPs agreement, with the current “data exclusivity regime, none of
these provisions matter anymore”).
147
See supra Part I.A.
148
See infra Parts II.B.1–3.
149
See infra Parts II.B.1.
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requirements are already part of Malaysian regulatory practice.150
Third, data exclusivity and linkage requirements will not hinder the
compulsory licensing mechanism.151 The FTA’s provisions on
drug regulatory data will not prevent access to low cost medicines,
and are necessary to encourage investment and innovation. The
implications of each provision will be discussed in turn.152
1. Data Exclusivity is Needed as an Incentive for Drug
Innovators to Carry Out Expensive Clinical Tests on
Off-Patent Drugs
Malaysia hopes to use IP to promote innovation and growth in
research and technology fields.153 Data exclusivity is viewed by the
pharmaceutical industry as being critical to “enable Malaysia to
have access to new therapies developed both locally and overseas
that may otherwise not be available [, and] will create a favourable
environment for biosciences investment . . . on par with other
leading knowledge based countries[.]”154 If protection is not
provided for clinical test data, subsequent manufacturers who rely
on that data have a competitive advantage by not having to spend
the time and money to produce it themselves.155 If the increase in
competition from generics makes marketing of drugs unprofitable,
then originator companies may not be willing to conduct the
clinical trials at all, and the drug will never reach the market.156 In
addition to the instrumental considerations, there is also an
equitable argument—simply that later manufacturers are unfairly
“benefiting from the ‘sweat of the brow’ of the initial
registrant.”157 Malaysia can benefit from data exclusivity because
it will create an overall stronger domestic IP framework.158
150

See infra Parts II.B.2.
See infra Parts II.B.3.
152
See infra Parts II.B.1–3.
153
See MALAYSIA-ECONOMIC PLAN, supra note 36, at 268.
154
DE-PhAMA, supra note 114, at 2.
155
See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 468–69.
156
Id. at 469–70.
157
Id. at 469.
158
PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF MALAYSIA, DATA EXCLUSIVITY—A COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE IN THE BIOSCIENCES ENVIRONMENT 3, http://www.phama.org.my/pdf_
document/DATA%20EXCLUSIVITY.pdf [hereinafter PHAMA—COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE]
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
151
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Therefore, the country will be more effective in attracting foreign
investment, and in developing a national drug research-anddevelopment-based industry.159
As patent and data exclusivity periods typically run parallel to
each other, it is only in the case of a drug taking over fifteen years
from patent issuance to reaching the market that any extension in
exclusivity would arise.160 However, a study of prescription drugs
receiving marketing approval from 1998 to 2006 elucidates the
importance of a non-patent exclusivity.161 Of 137 drugs approved
during the relevant time period, “for twenty-three drugs out of this
137 total, the period of marketing exclusivity extended past the
expiry of the last patent.”162 If there is a long delay between the
beginning of a patent term and the point at which the drug is ready
for sale, the term may be so near expiration that a firm would
choose not to incur the costs of bringing the drug to market.163 The
five-year data exclusivity protection at least insures drug
developers a short period in which they are essentially guaranteed
to have a market free of competition.164
Clinical test data protection in Malaysia is also valuable for
chemical compounds that are not covered by a patent, as “more
and more compounds which are not patent protected are being
developed and . . . in these instances data exclusivity is the only
available intellectual property protection.”165 For instance,
had generic copies of TAXOL®, (paclitaxel), BristolMyers Squibb’s anti-cancer drug, which did not have any
patents on its active ingredient, been able to be approved
immediately, [the originator] would not have had any
incentive to incur the extensive costs (estimated at well in

159

Id.
See supra Part II.A.1.
161
See Junod, supra note 50, at 486–88. The result of the study is available at
http://www.pharmalaw.org/marketing%20exclusivity%20dates%20(12.3.04).doc (last
visited Feb. 27, 2007).
162
Id. at 487.
163
See id. at 488.
164
See id. at 479.
165
PHAMA—COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 158, at 3.
160
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excess of $500 million) to develop, test and bring TAXOL
to market.166
If an originator company will immediately be faced with
generic competition upon the initial marketing of its product, then
the company may not even bother conducting research and testing
on new uses of off-patent substances or new indications.167 But,
with a guaranteed five-year period of marketing free from generic
competition, pharmaceutical firms will continue to research new
uses for products that are not protected by a patent.168 Data
exclusivity is a strong protection, that prevents generic companies
from competing in the market before a pioneering company has
had an opportunity to recoup its R&D costs.169
As the five-year term expires, firms can obtain an additional
three years of exclusivity for a new indication of that same
product, which can make it profitable to continue testing drugs
even after they are no longer protected by a patent or the initial
data exclusivity grant.170 One example of where this could be an
effective mechanism for creating further R&D incentives is when a
new indication of a drug is actually operating in a different field
from the originator drug.171 For instance, a drug that originally
was being used by dermatologists could effectively be prescribed
for its use in a new capacity by cardiologists.172 To continue
testing a drug after it has been marketed and sold, pharmaceutical
166

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATIONS,
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA
EXCLUSIVITY 7 (2000), http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR643/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf.
167
Id.
168
See id.
169
See Junod, supra note 50, at 492–93 (assessing the difficulties associated with
challenging clinical test data exclusivity).
170
But see Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 728–30 (arguing that the three year exclusivity
“is likely to have little effect on incentives to conduct clinical trials of new uses of
previously approved drugs”).
171
John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune—Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and
Patent Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 1, 60 n.217 (1998).
172
Id. But see id. (explaining that the “three-year exclusivity period may turn out to be
illusory [because i]f there are generic products on the market approved for the pioneer
use, despite the inability to disclose the newly protected use in labeling materials for
generic copies, doctors may nonetheless engage in off-label use of the generic product for
the protected use, thus destroying data exclusivity for the new use.”).
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companies require the economic incentive of a three year market
exclusivity extension.173
2. Linkage Requirements Protect Patent Owners’ Investments,
and Create a More Efficient Regulatory Framework
By notifying patent owners when a generic company is making
an application for approval, and requiring patent infringement
issues to be resolved before marketing approval is granted, linkage
requirements are beneficial to pioneer drug companies and the
regulatory system.174 First, notice is given to the holder of the
relevant patent, allowing him or her to “take the patent status into
account before launching a development program or submitting an
application, and [it allows companies to ensure] that the regulatory
agencies have the necessary information to fairly access the
patent.”175If there is insufficient communication between a DRA
and a patenting agency, then there is the possibility that a product
without authorization will enter the market.176 Second, by
enabling a strong administrative environment, regulatory agencies
can handle complex disputes that would otherwise be a drain on
the judicial system.177
If a generic product is granted regulatory approval, despite
infringing on a valid patent, then the originator company will need
to bring a judicial action to adjudicate the patent infringement
when the infringement could have simply been prevented by the
DRA.
3. It is Unlikely that the FTA Provisions Will Prevent
Malaysia from Using Compulsory Licenses to Address
Public Health Concerns
Amid concern that IP rights would stand in the way of
providing life-saving medications to patients in the developing
173

See Junod, supra note 50, 496–97.
PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF MALAYSIA ET AL., PATENT LINKAGE 2 (2006),
http://www.phama.org.my/pdf_document/PL_FTA_March2006.pdf [hereinafter PLPHAMA].
175
Id.
176
See id. at 3.
177
See id.
174
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world, in 2001 the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPs agreement and public health.178 The Declaration provided
that countries have “the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted.”179 The FTAs that the U.S. is pursuing will not interfere
with the WTO’s Declaration. The U.S. has made it clear through
side letters that IP provisions in FTAs “do not affect a Party’s
ability to take necessary measures to protect public health by
promoting access to medicines for all[.]”180
The proposition that data exclusivity would prevent a country
from using a compulsory license was rejected in a letter from the
U.S. Trade Representative to Congressman Sandy Levin
(D-Mich.), which reiterated what was stated in the side letter on
health to the U.S.-Morocco Agreement. The follow up letter reads:
If circumstances ever arise in which a drug is produced
under a compulsory license, and it is necessary to approve
that drug to protect public health or effectively utilize the
TRIPs/public health solution, the data protection provision
in the FTA would not stand in the way . . . [the side letter
is] a significant part of the interpretive context for this
agreement and is not merely rhetorical . . . [a]ccording to
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.181

178

See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
PUBLIC HEALTH (2001), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.htm.
179
Id.
180
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health, Aug. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/
asset_upload_file697_3975.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA Understanding]; see also U.S.Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Side Letter on Public Health, June 15, 2004, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text/asset
_upload_file258_3852.pdf (containing nearly identical language to CAFTA’s
understanding).
181
Letter from the United States Trade Representative, General Counsel, John K.
Veroneau
to Congressman Sandy Levin (July 19, 2004), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr627&dbname=108&; see Fink &
Reichenmiller, supra note 82, at 3.
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While not part of the main text, side letters are read as part of
the agreement between the two parties.182 If there was a dispute
settlement proceeding between the U.S. and Malaysia, it is likely
that “any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”
would be considered part of the treaty obligations.183 If the USTR
does not include such an understanding in the current negotiations,
it is also possible that the U.S.-Malaysia FTA could follow the
model of the U.S.-Chile FTA which included a clause specifically
dealing with public health; it provided that the parties have
specified the terms of the agreements “[r]ecognizing the principles
set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement on Public
Health.”184 The USTR has given its trade partners assurances that
the need for strong IP protections will not interfere with the
country’s ability to take measures necessary to protect public
health.185
III. BY ALLOWING PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS TO EXTEND
THEIR MARKET MONOPOLIES, THE U.S.-MALAYSIA
FTA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS DO NOT
PROPERLY BALANCE THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE
INNOVATION WITH PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS
The U.S. is using bilateral trade negotiations to supplement the
IP terms of the TRIPs agreement, particularly those relating to the
protection of drug regulatory data.186 Implementing the data
exclusivity provisions required by the FTAs is not taken lightly, as
the U.S. and EU are using trade sanctions to retaliate against

182
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_
1969.pdf [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
183
Id.
184
Chile FTA, supra note 91, art. 17, preamble. But see Australia Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Australia, May 18, 2004 and Singapore FTA, supra note 83 (neither
containing a side letter on public health or any explicit mention of the Doha Declaration
on TRIPs and Public Health).
185
See CAFTA Understanding, supra note 180.
186
See supra Parts I.A, I.C.3, & II.A.
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developing countries that fail to apply the stricter requirements.187
The U.S.-Malaysia FTA will make it more difficult for Malaysians
to acquire low costs drugs by (1) extending periods of patent
market exclusivity for originator drug companies by delaying
regulatory approval for subsequent generic manufactures, and
(2) limiting the role that the Malaysian government can play in
increasing competition through the use of compulsory licensing.188
These heightened requirements will be aggressively enforced, and
will provide governments with far less leeway than agreed to under
the TRIPs agreement.189 For a country with pressing public health
concerns,190 and a robust generic market, the impacts of these
provisions will be more drastic in Malaysia than in FTAs with
other states or regions.191
The United States’ FTAs that have been negotiated in recent
years are largely similar in the field of IP requirements, as prior
agreements serve as a framework for subsequent negotiations.192
Data exclusivity and patent linkage will certainly be part of the
negotiations, and it is more than likely that they will ultimately
appear in the concluded agreement.193
These predictable
consequences of these FTA provisions will be discussed in
Parts IV.A(1)–(2). Then, in Section IV.B, the more speculative
question of how they will impact Malaysia’s ability to use
compulsory licensing will be assessed.

187

MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, ICTSD-UNCTAD DIALOGUE ON ENSURING POLICY OPTIONS
AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PHARMACEUTICAL DATA EXCLUSIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INNOVATION AND MARKET
ACCESS
1
(2004),
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_
Bellagio3.pdf (referring to the experiences of Israel, Turkey, and India, which have
resulted in generic drugs manufactures being perceived as “national champions”).
188
See supra Parts II.1–3.
189
See supra Parts I.C.2–3, I.D.
190
See supra Part I.A.
191
Even with a strong generic market, Malaysian drug prices were already 20–76%
higher than in India. Douglas W. Bettcher, Derek Yach & G. Emmanueal Guindon,
Global Trade and Health: Key Linkages and Future Challenges, 78 Bulletin of the World
Health Organization 527 (2000) (citing A. Subramanian, Putting Some Numbers on the
TRIPs Pharmaceutical Debate, 10 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 1, 1–17 (1994)).
192
See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text.
193
See id.
FOR
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A. Data Exclusivity
In the United States, Congress introduced marketing data
exclusivity with the primary objective of encouraging “the
development and testing of unpatentable pharmaceuticals.”194 This
policy is circumvented by two unfortunate facts of the regulatory
data protection laws that are being exported in trade agreements.
First, there is no requirement that medical advances to off-patent
drugs be innovative.195 In fact, in the EU, the drug regulatory
authority “has claimed that less than half of the 126 products
approved . . . in its first five years ‘could be considered
innovative.’”196 The only requirement for granting data exclusivity
is that the product be a “new chemical entity,” a concept “with a
broader meaning than required under the TRIPs Agreement”197
which “not surprisingly . . . favours the interests of the U.S.
pharmaceutical companies.”198
Second, beyond the policy of increasing R&D expenditures
relating to off-patent drugs, data exclusivity protections increase
the length of patent terms in a significant number of drugs.199 An
economic model used to determine the increase in drug prices in
Peru as a result of the data exclusivity provision of a U.S. FTA
estimates that seven years after the agreement came into effect,
households would have to increase expenditures on medicines by
$130.7 million “to maintain the same level of access to
medicines.”200 In countries that have high proportions of their
population in need of life saving medications, a delay in generic
194

See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 29 (1984)).
195
See Junod, supra note 50.
196
See id. at 515.
197
Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 87.
198
Id.
199
Junod, supra note 50, at 487.
200
JUAN PICHIHUA SERNA, ICTSD, WHO, AND THE WORLD BANK INSTITUTE,
DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS ON
DRUG PRICES: POSSIBLE IMPACT OF US-PERU FTA ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES DUE TO
DATA EXCLUSIVITY PROTECTION FOR DRUGS 6 (2006), http://www.iprsonline.org/uncta
dictsd/dialogue/2006-07-31/9Peru%20Study-PichihuarevisedAug10.pdf. It is important
to note that the study only considers the drugs for which the data exclusivity runs
consecutively with their patent term, so the exact costs are skewed from a typical real
world market. Id. at 1.
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market competition—whether a one-year (linkage) or five-year
(data exclusivity) delay—could keep drugs beyond the budget
constraints of many citizens or third party purchasers (e.g., the
government).201 Plus, data exclusivity actually encourages drug
companies to release improved variations of existing drugs slowly,
so as to receive additional periods of exclusivity as its current term
of exclusivity is near expiration.202
The argument that it is feasible for a generic company to
simply produce its own clinical data is economically203 and
equitably204 untenable. Even if it was financially possible for
generic companies to reproduce clinical test data, as an ethical
matter, requiring generic companies to reproduce clinical test data
that is already in the archives of a drug regulatory authority is
unacceptable.205 Requiring a company to conduct clinical trials on
life threatening drugs, when a regulatory authority already has
information demonstrating the drugs’ safety and efficacy,
needlessly puts patients at risk.206 Conducting duplicative tests
also needlessly causes the suffering and death of twelve million
animals per year. 207
The benefits of data exclusivity are questioned even in the most
advanced knowledge-based markets of the U.S., EU, and Japan;
these are the nations with the healthiest populations and largest
pharmaceutical R&D industries.208 In light of Malaysia’s need to
have drugs be affordable and available as soon as possible, instead
of allowing regulatory data protection to extend beyond the end of
201

See, e.g., id. at 6.
See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 729.
203
See Rajkumar, supra note 105 and accompanying text. The economic and practical
considerations were discussed separately in Part I.C.3.
204
See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 474.
205
See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text; see also Implementation of U.S.
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Chile and Singapore: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter
Waxman Statement] (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
206
See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 474.
207
Id. Twelve million animals are used each year to test drugs in the U.S. alone. Id.
(internal citations omitted).
208
See generally, PUGATCH, supra note 187 (discussing, in parts 1–3, the competing
policy considerations that the U.S. and EU DRAs weighed in deciding on appropriate
regulatory schemes).
202
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a patent term, the data exclusivity and patent exclusivity periods
should expire concurrently.209 Alternatively, the data exclusivity
could be administered with a sunset provision that would come
into effect once the IP holder has received a predetermined
percentage return on his or her investment.210 Nearly twenty
percent of pharmaceuticals receive extended market monopoly
periods from data exclusivity.211 A mechanism must be in place to
limit any effective extensions to the previously established twentyyear patent term.212
B. Patent Linkage
Patent linkage provisions are detrimental to generic markets for
many of the same reasons as data exclusivity.213 However, while it
was estimated that approximately one in five drugs will get their
market monopoly extended with data exclusivity, linkage
requirements will delay every single generic product’s entry into
the market if the originator drug is under patent.214 The amount of
time that linkage requirements add to the market exclusivity is
however long it takes a country’s DRA to approve a drug, as the
approval process will no longer begin during the originator drug’s
patent term. In Malaysia, this delay will be approximately twelve
to eighteen months, giving all patented medicines terms of twentyone to twenty-one and a half years, instead of the twenty-year
terms in accordance with the TRIPs Agreement.215
This
calculation does not even account for the cases in which data
exclusivity or other extensions that patent law may provide are
present.216
209

See generally supra Part II.A.1.
See Health Registration Data Exclusivity, Biomedical Research, and Restrictions on
the Introduction of Generic Drugs, Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of James P. Love, Consumer Project on Technology), available
at http://www.cptech.org/pharm/senhregd.html; Junod, supra note 50, at 515.
211
See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
212
See supra notes 165–174 and accompanying text.
213
Id.
214
See supra Part II.A(2).
215
Id.
216
See, e.g., FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 82, at 5 (noting that a number of FTAs
grant exclusivity extensions for delays in the regulatory approval process).
210
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Linkage requirements will have an impact on nearly all
medications, and cumulatively will have an even more drastic
effect than data exclusivity extensions. These provisions are
certainly TRIPs-Plus, and, in practice “patent-registration linkage
goes beyond the standards applied in developed countries.”217 One
commentator observes that U.S. FTA IP standards
raise[] questions about how bilateral the U.S. bilateralism
actually is . . . . [In fact,] the absolute and automatic patentregistration linkage seems to go beyond U.S. law . . . . By
creating through bilateral negotiations standards of
protection higher than those applied domestically, the
powerful U.S. pharmaceutical industry may be able to force
an amendment of U.S. domestic law in ways simpler and
less costly that [sic] through lobbying in Congress.218
Using FTAs to increase the level of IP protection in U.S.
domestic law may not be effective unless Congress accedes to the
goals of the USTR, and it is unlikely that Malaysia would attempt
to force this issue by engaging in political criticism of it largest
trading partner.219
The fact that the linkage requirements
propounded by the USTR exceed developed-nation standards,
however, should be alarming to developing countries asked to
implement these standards.
The disparity in bargaining power in bilateral agreements
between the industrialized U.S. and developing countries is
illustrated by one commentator who notes that “[w]hile the U.S.
might have to yield to the EU, Japan or China on certain points in
the WTO process, the absence of these players in bilateral trade
negotiations means that the U.S. can extract whatever preferential
terms of trade it wants.”220 Malaysia, on the other hand, may not
have the option of ignoring or circumventing the FTA terms it
217

See Correa: Bilateralism supra note 85, at 90.
Id. at 93.
219
See Press Release, Office of the USTR, United States Malaysia Announce Intention
to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/March/United_States,_Malaysia_Announce_Int
ention_to_Negotiate_Free_Trade_Agreement.html; see also Rajkumar, supra note 28, at
450.
220
Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 450.
218
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feels are not suitable for its legal and social context.221 The U.S.
has not hesitated to coerce other nations into adopting heightened
legal standards in trade agreements using economic sanctions.222
The unyielding readiness of the U.S. to force compliance should be
considered by nations, like Malaysia, who may be sacrificing much
by implementing an inflexible IP regime.223
Proponents of patent linkage argue that at one point Malaysia’s
DRA was in practice using an unofficial linkage requirement to
prevent generic application for approval.224 This informal practice
that was developed has begun to wane, however, and now “there
appears to be a shift in this practice and . . . generic applications
have been approved despite valid existing patents.”225
Unfortunately for generic competition in Malaysia, despite the
trend in allowing generic drugs to be approved and thus ready for
market access upon the expiration of a patent, the U.S. FTA will
reinstate the abandoned linkage practice.226
C. Compulsory Licensing
The extension of exclusivity periods is not the only adverse
effect that the data exclusivity and linkage requirements will

221

See id. (noting that only the most powerful countries are able to extract concessions
from U.S. trade negotiators).
222
See id. at 450, 455, 470–71 (citing U.S. trade sanctions being used as a method of
pushing for increased intellectual property protection in Nicaragua and Guatemala). In
Guatemala, the domestic legislature attempted to repeal its data exclusivity law and
replace it with a new law that allowed for increased generic participation in the market.
Id. However, “the USTR has prevailed in its efforts to force Guatemala to repeal the . . .
legislation.” Id. The United States will undoubtedly demand a “strict interpretation of the
data protection provisions.” Id.
223
See id. at 450–51 (describing the “unpreparedness” of developing countries during
bilateral trade negotiations).
224
See PL-PHAMA, supra note 174, at 2; Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO, Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, Testimony Before the Interagency Trade Policy Staff
Committee on the Proposed Free Trade Agreement with Malaysia: Generic
Pharmaceutical Association (May 3, 2006), available at http://www.us-asean.org/USMalaysia%20FTA/Generic_Pharmaceutical_Association.pdf.
225
See PL-PHAMA, supra note 174, at 2 (noting that the linkage requirements were
never codified anyway, so the drug control authority had no obligation to exercise patent
linking practice).
226
See supra notes 214–215, 224–225 and accompanying text.
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entail.227 As discussed in sections II.A.3 and II.B.3, there is
speculation that compulsory licensing possibilities will be nullified
by the strict exclusive rights granted for regulatory test data. Some
FTAs include provisions that specifically address this legal
ambiguity, and others include side letters that provide the U.S.’s
understandings of these provisions.228 Different FTAs have
handled this issue in various ways, and as trade agreement
discussions are conducted with little or no transparency,229 it is
impossible to say which approach the U.S. will take this time.230
The three specific possibilities that appear in previous FTAs are
(1) providing a main text clause that requires interpretations that
conform with the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health,231
(2) giving assurances in side letters that the TRIPs-Plus obligations
will not interfere with national compulsory licensing schemes,232
and (3) not providing any clarification or interpretive guidance on
the interaction of data exclusivity/linkage and compulsory
licensing.233
If there is a clause in the main text of the agreement referring
to the Doha Declaration, which made it clear that compulsory
licensing was a key attribute for developing countries to use in
fighting health crises, then presumably the TRIPs-Plus obligations
would not be permitted to interfere with compulsory licensing.234
The ambiguities would likely be resolved in the favor of the
developing country if the issue were brought before an ad-hoc
dispute settlement body.235
If, however, the public health concerns were addressed in a
separate side letter, the interpretive value would not be as clear.
227

See supra Parts II.A.3 & II.B.3.
See infra Parts III.A.3 & III.B.3.
229
See The Domino Effect of US FTAs, supra note 23 and accompanying text; Abbot,
supra note 3.
230
Abbott, supra note 3.
231
See Chile FTA, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
232
See supra Part III.B.3.
233
See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text.
234
See World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003,
WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 (2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
235
See infra notes 236–241 and accompanying text (discussing the questionable value
of side letters when compared to main text terms within trade agreements).
228
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First, side letters may be deficient because of the restrictive way
that they are drafted.236 In the CAFTA side letter, for example, the
“USTR rewrote . . . the Doha Declaration to reflect a U.S.preferred outcome to WTO negotiations,” and does not fairly
reflect the language of the Declaration itself.237 The language used
attempted to impose a “scope-of-diseases” limitation on when
compulsory licenses could permissibly be used by a
government.238 Second, while the Vienna Convention requires that
side letters be considered as part of the FTA’s overall context, the
side letters may also be seen as “merely signal[ing] the signing
governments’ belief that the intellectual property rules of the FTAs
will not interfere with the protection of public health.”239 Further,
the office of the USTR has informed World Bank staff that in its
view the understandings do not create any “exemption that would
allow parties to the FTAs to ignore obligations in the agreements’
intellectual property chapters.”240 If side letters are understood as
no more than a prediction by the U.S. government, then they
provide no guarantees as to the true workability of the compulsory
licensing mechanism.241
Another potential option is that the U.S.-Malaysia FTA could
simply not address the negative implications that data
exclusivity/patent linkage could have on compulsory licensing.242
If a dispute arose between the parties to the agreement, there would
236

See Abbott, supra note 3, at 352.
Id. at 352–53.
238
Id. Furthermore, the side letter qualifies the terms of the Declaration by requiring that
any use of a compulsory license must be “necessary.” See CAFTA Understanding, supra
note 180; CARLOS CORREA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE,
PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS THAT MAY AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8 (2006), available at http://www.idcid.org.br/wtoandbeyond/
Provisions%20in%20Free%20Trade%20Agreements%20that%20May%20Affect%20
Access%20to%20Medicines%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20-%20Carlos%20
Correa.doc.
239
FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 82, at 3 (emphasis added).
240
Id. at 3, 10.
241
See supra notes 236–239 and accompanying text. For example, the U.S.-Australia
trade agreement does not mention the Doha Declaration. See Free Trade Agreement,
May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., ch. 11, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/ asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf.
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be no assurances that Malaysia was acting within its sovereign
rights by issuing a license.243
The FTA provisions on compulsory licensing are particularly
important to Malaysia. Compulsory licenses have rarely been
issued to manufacture generic drugs, but Malaysia has shown that
it is willing to do so.244 Even when licenses have not been used, a
government threatening to introduce new competition has proved
to be a powerful bargaining chip to force manufacturers to produce
necessary quantities of a drug at an affordable price.245 Malaysia,
both because of its willingness to be flexible with patent rights, and
because of its public heath situation, must have the legal means to
issue compulsory licenses.246 Whichever provision the FTA
includes on data exclusivity and patent linkage, Malaysia’s trade
negotiators should insist on an understanding that allows the
government to use TRIPs-type flexibilities.247 Better yet, the FTA
should indicate what additional steps a government must take to
issue a license in light of the two stipulations on clinical test data
exclusivity.248
IV. CONCLUSION
The multilateral TRIPs negotiations were concluded with a
number of compromises between the developed and developing
world, and ultimately “represent[ed] a victory of collective
bargaining power” for developing countries.249
Bilateral
negotiations, conversely, allow a dominant country to impose its
243
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See supra Part II.A.
245
See William Onzivu, Globalism, Regionalism, or Both: Health Policy and Regional
Economic Integration in Developing Countries, an Evolution of a Legal Regime?,
15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 111, 140 n.175 (2006) (giving a brief synopsis of the laws in South
Africa and Brazil that create a framework wherein a government could issue a
compulsory license) (citations omitted).
246
See generally supra Parts I.A, II.A.3.
247
See generally supra Parts I.A, II.A.3.
248
See generally Robert Weissman, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151–78
(Pedro Roffe et al. eds., Earthscan 2006) (describing the different approaches that
countries may take in implementing new data exclusivity protections).
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desired IP regime on a developing nation, instead of forcing parties
to reach an international consensus before determining appropriate
standards for the global economy .250 By using FTAs the U.S. “is
engaged in a systematic effort to increase international intellectual
property protection, one country at a time.”251
As in all IP regimes, a country’s “regulatory system of
marketing/data exclusivity should be . . . tailored to balance the
conflicting interests it is supposed to take into account.”252 When
developed countries like the United States try to strike this balance,
they will inevitably have different priorities and concerns than a
developing country.253 On the other hand, there is a need to have
some minimum level of IP rights in order to attract foreign
investment and to develop homegrown research and development.
The TRIPs Agreement mandated that patents must carry twentyyear terms, and also afforded developing countries a number of
mechanisms to maintain flexibility with IP protections.254 Free
trade agreements are increasing the obligations of developing
nations by effectively extending patent terms, and perhaps even
eliminating compulsory licensing.255
After including U.S.-style drug regulation in FTAs with Chile
and Singapore, even Congressman Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.),
who sponsored the U.S. version of the legislation, expressed
concern that such a regulatory regime would be inappropriate in
developing countries.256 In a statement to the House Ways and
Mean Committee, he observed that:
250
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See Jacqueline Ann Surin, Local drug makers may lose out under US FTA, THE
EDGE DAILY, July 17, 2006, available at http://www.theedgedaily.com/cms/content.jsp?
id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_772db6e3-cb73c03a-110b6400-7d0bac10. Local generic
manufacturers, private and public, will be adversely affected by the new IP protections.
Id. For example, “‘[t]he World Health Organisation predicted that Colombia’s generic
industry would lose up to 71% of its market share due to its US FTA, while one-third of
Australia’s generic companies had to close or merge when data exclusivity alone was
introduced in Australia.’” Id. (emphasis added); see also Rupa Damodaran, Malaysian
manufacturers wary of US move on patents, BUSINESS TIMES, MALAYSIA, Aug. 22, 2006.
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devastating epidemics in the developing world, including
AIDS, TB, and malaria are killing millions of people and
crippling whole societies. Even in middle-income
countries, leading killers like heart disease, diabetes, cancer
and other conditions are going untreated because essential
medications are unaffordable in these countries, costing
many times the average citizen’s annual income . . . . [T]o
impose [the U.S. intellectual property] system on a country
without a safety net, depriving millions of people of lifesaving drugs, is irresponsible and even unethical.257
Malaysia is transitioning into a knowledge-based economy, and
wants to encourage research and development-based investment.
However, the level of IP protection that will be imposed by its
FTA with the U.S. will go beyond what is necessary to accomplish
these goals.258 As patent terms for pharmaceutical products will
effectively be increased from twenty years to twenty-one to
twenty-five years, generic drugs will be delayed in entering the
market, and prices will rise accordingly.259 If, after the adoption of
the FTA, market-determined prices of medicines become too
expensive for Malaysian consumers, the government may no
longer have the ability to issue a compulsory license.260
During the continuing trade discussions, even if Malaysia’s
negotiators accept longer exclusivity periods for originator drug
companies, the price increases can be managed so long as a clause
insuring the availability of compulsory licensing is insisted
upon.261 If compulsory licensing is in effect eliminated from the
257
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Markiman Kobiran, has said that “[t]he reality is Malaysia cannot avoid [sic] signing a
258

GALANTUCCI_FINAL_050807

2007

U.S.-MALAYSIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

5/8/2007 1:06:06 PM

1123

government’s arsenal of competition-increasing legal mechanisms,
drug prices could dangerously escalate with no viable means of
regulation.262 As the U.S. is “Malaysia’s largest trading partner
and [its] largest foreign investor,”263 the harsh reality of the
bilateral negotiation forum is that the U.S.’s bargaining power may
prevent Malaysia from extracting even those minimal concessions
that are necessary for it to deal with public health crises.

FTA with any country including the US.” Table FTA Document In Parliament For
Debate—Backbencher, BILATERALS.ORG, Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.bilaterals.org/
article.php3?id_article=7537&var_recherche=FTA+document+in+Parliament+.
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Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/Press_Releases/2006/March/United_States,_Malaysia_Announce_Intention_to_
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